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OWNER-INTRUDER CONTESTS
Jay Bisen1, Faheem Farooq1, Manaeil Hasan1, Akhil Patel2
1Department of Biology, 2Department of Biomedical Engineering
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA
Introduction
• In nature, kleptoparasitism, the stealing of resources, occurs across
species including insects, birds, fish, and mammals.
• We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals -
Owner and Intruder. The Owner is in a possession of a resource
when it spots Intruder. The Owner has to decide whether to de-
fend the resource. If the Owner defends, the Intruder has to decide
whether to fight with the Owner.
• We determine under what conditions should they fight over a re-
source.
• The conditions also depend on three distinct information cases:
– Full information: the Owner and Intruder know the resource val-
ues for themselves and each other.
– Partial information: the Owner and Intruder only know the re-
source value for themselves.
– No Information: the Owner and Intruder do not know the re-
source values for themselves and each other.
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Fig. 1: Scheme and payoffs of the Owner-Intrude game. In the terminal nodes, (PO, PI) means payoffs to
the Owner and Intruder. The game is solved by backward induction.
Notation Meaning
VI Value of the resource for the Intruder
VO Value of the resource for the Owner
c Cost of the fight
a Probability of the Owner winning the fight
piI Probability that the Intruder will attack; piI = Prob
(
c
1−a < VI
)
piO Probability that the Owner will defend; piO = Prob
(c
a < VO
)
P Info caseO Payoff to the Owner in the given information case
P Info caseI Payoff to the Intruder in the given information case
E[V ] Expected value of the resource for the Owner or Intruder
Table 1: Summary of the notation.
Results
Behavior and Payoffs Full information Partial information No information
Owner Intruder
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c
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Table 2: Summary of behavioral outcomes and payoffs.
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Fig. 2: Behavioral outcomes of the game for the different information cases. The payoffs depend on the behavior of the Owner and Intruder
and are as follows: 1) when Owner defends and Intruder flees: PO = VO, PI = 0, 2) when Owner defends and Intruder attacks:
PO = aVO − c, PI = (1− a)VI − c, 3) when Owner flees and Intruder takes the resource: PO = 0, PI = VI .
Left: Full information case. Center: Partial information case. Right: No information case
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Fig. 3: Mean payoffs to the Owner (top) and Intruders (bottom) under different information cases. Here c varies, VO and VI are drawn from
the uniform distribution on (0, 4) and a = 0.4 (left) or a = 0.6 (right).
Changing the order of players
• In the full information and the no information case, the order of
players matters only for small values of VO and VI .
• The individual deciding first has an advantage - it bluffs by pretend-
ing to be ready to fight; the fight is too costly for the other individual
to call the bluff.
• In the partial information case, there are four regions where the
order matters.
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Fig. 4: Partial information case - the effect of the order of the decisions. Region I: The second individual
has an advantage. Region II: The first individual has the advantage. Region III: It is better for the Owner to
go first and for the Intruder to go second. Region IV: It is better for the Intruder to go first and for the Owner
to go second.
Conclusions
• The actual fights occur only when the cost of the fight is relatively
low compared to the resource value. This is in an agreement with
previous experiments.
• Under most circumstances, it is beneficial for the individual to know
more rather than to know less.
• However, the no information case is sometimes best for the Owner
(because the Intruder will flee and not fight).
• Increasing the opponent’s knowledge may be helpful in some in-
stances and detrimental in others.
• The order of players matters - going first is better in most circum-
stances, but going second is sometimes best in the partial infor-
mation case.
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